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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the degree to which information asymmetries play a role in the closed-end fund 
seasoned offerings and introduce a new explanation for why funds with low information 
asymmetry also choose to issue.  Interpreting turnover ratio as a proxy for information 
asymmetry, we test for differences in turnover across fund types and find that equity and 
international fund issuers generate significantly higher turnover than debt and domestic fund 
issuers respectively. We then investigate the motives for issuing funds with low information 
asymmetry and discover that they are good asset market timers, i.e. issue when underlying asset 
markets are relatively underpriced. By timing asset markets, such funds generate better long-run 
returns and maximize the interests of long-term investors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
everal studies have examined the market response to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) made by industrial 
firms.  Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that firms offering either IPOs or SEOs 
significantly underperform nonissuing firms over two to five years following the issue.  White and Lusztig 
(1980), Hansen (1988), Kothare (1997) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) all find evidence of significantly negative 
announcement day returns associated with rights offerings made by US industrial firms.  One of the common 
explanations for the negative market reaction to the announcement of a seasoned offering is the information 
asymmetry model developed by Myers and Majluf (1984).  Given the difficulty in valuing the assets of the firm, 
investors have no accurate way of discerning the true value of the firm.  Thus, based on the Myers and Majluf 
model, investors assume that managers are more likely to issue equity when they believe, based on their superior 
information of their firm, that the market is overvaluing their stock.  Therefore, information asymmetries between 
shareholders and managers drive the negative market reaction to a seasoned offering. 
 
Closed-end funds provide a better sample to test information asymmetry hypothesis. First, by holding 
marketable securities, closed-end funds have less of an information asymmetry problem than industrial firms. 
Second, some closed-end funds suffer more information asymmetry than others due to various difficulties in pricing 
different security instruments. Generally, debt and domestic securities are easier to price than equity and 
international securities.  
 
Similar to industrial firms, SEOs of closed-end funds also receive negative announcement day returns. This 
has been documented by Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and Higgins, Howton and Howton (2003). In addition, 
Higgins, Howton and Howton (2003) also find evidence that funds with relatively high information asymmetry i.e. 
equity and international funds) have more negative announcement day returns than funds with low information 
asymmetry (i.e. debt and domestic funds). Such evidence provides at least partial support for the presence of 
information asymmetry and drives the need to discover to what degree information asymmetry plays a role in 
closed-end funds SEOs.  
S 
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In this paper, we first introduce a new proxy for information asymmetry, turnover ratio, to verify the 
presence of information asymmetry. Higher turnover ratio is generally associated with greater information 
asymmetry. We examine changes in turnover ratio from pre-offering to post-offering period. Next, we investigate 
the motives for funds with low information asymmetry to issue seasoned offerings.  By examining the trends in 
underlying asset markets, we find supportive evidence that funds with few information asymmetries could issue to 
take advantage of favorable asset market conditions.  
 
The major contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we test the power of an alternative proxy for 
information asymmetry within the sample of closed-end fund issuers. Second, we present a new explanation for why 
low information asymmetry funds also issue. In previous work on seasoned offerings, equity market timing based on 
information asymmetry is often used to explain the post-offering performance. This fails to justify why some fund 
issuers have positive post-offering returns while others suffer negative returns. Apparently, funds with positive long-
run performance are not timing the equity market. Asset market timing is proposed as an equally important tool 
available to fund managers to exploit pricing inefficiencies in the underlying asset markets. Thus, funds can time 
their offerings when underlying asset markets are underpriced and thus capitalize on favorable market conditions 
when asset markets are priced correctly.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
There is not complete agreement as to the cause of the negative market responses or the poor long-run 
performance around seasoned offerings by closed-end funds. Some studies attribute the negative market reaction at 
announcement to governance or agency cost related factors. Akhigbe and Madura (2001) find that the abnormal 
returns for closed-end fund seasoned offerings are inversely related to the expense ratio of the fund. Khorana, Wahal 
and Zenner (2002) find that the degree to which closed-end fund premiums decline around rights offerings is 
directly related to the fund‟s advisor fees and the fund‟s affiliation with the broker-dealer used in the rights offering. 
However, the evidence in Higgins, Howton and Howton (2002) and Higgins, Howton and Howton (2003) make it 
rather difficult to completely rule out the relation between information asymmetries and the negative reaction for 
closed-end funds. Higgins, Howton and Howton (2002) find that closed-end fund seasoned offerings cause a 
significant and negative reaction across all non-issuing closed-end funds within the same sector. It is difficult to 
justify that governance or agency factors could generate this spill-over effect to non-issuers. Therefore, there exists a 
need to reevaluate the information asymmetry model as a possible explanation for the documented market reaction 
to closed-end fund offerings. 
 
In addition to supporting the presence of information asymmetry in closed-end funds SEOs, Higgins, 
Howton and Howton (2003) document less long-term underperformance for domestic and debt relative to 
international and equity funds. Since funds types can proxy for information asymmetry due to the varying pricing 
difficulty of securities, they conclude that the size of negative market reaction to closed-end funds issuers are 
directly related to the degree of information asymmetry of the funds.  
 
To further determine the role that information asymmetries play in both the initial market reaction and the 
long-term performance around fund SEOs, we use turnover ratio for the fund. Kyle (1985) and Llorente, Michaely, 
Saar and Wang (2002) find evidence that the turnover ratio is directly related to the degree of information 
asymmetry that exists for a firm‟s equity. Thus we expect to find significant difference in turnover ratios across fund 
types as well as significant difference in turnover ratios between issuing and non-issuing funds.  
 
 Then, what motivates funds with low information asymmetry to issue shares? Besides timing the equity 
market, fund managers have incentives to time the underlying asset markets. Instead of issuing shares when their 
funds trade at a significant premium to true value, they may actually choose to issue shares when asset prices are 
low. Doing so maximizes the long-run value of the fund as opposed to maximizing the short-term value to existing 
shareholders. We hypothesize 1) funds with low information asymmetry issue shares when asset markets are 
undervalued; 2) if funds issue to time asset markets, they are more likely to generate better long-run returns; 3) 
funds who time asset markets instead of equity markets are more likely to attract long-horizon investors.  
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To verify asset market timing, we follow the directions in Schultz (2003). If fund managers issue shares to 
capitalize on favorable opportunities in the underlying asset markets, we would expect to observe positive long-run 
stock performance as the fund ultimately reflects the performance of its underlying assets. Thus, we would 
anticipate that offerings by funds with fewer information asymmetries are preceded by worse than average asset 
markets allowing them to capitalize on potentially undervalued asset markets. We obtain a relevant market index for 
each issuing fund based on its investment objective and measure how asset markets move around the fund issuance. 
A proportion test is also used to compare the percentage of asset market timers across fund types.  
 
To verify whether issuing funds with low information asymmetry are more likely to attract long-horizon 
investors, we use the measure of turnover ratio to proxy for investor trading horizon. Froot, Perold and Stein (1992) 
state that higher turnover ratio is associated with shorter investor trading horizon. Subsequent research by Wahal and 
McConnell (2000) shows that investor trading horizon also influences managerial decisions regarding future 
investment. Therefore, managers at firms with higher trading volume may act myopic to cater to short-term 
investors. We expect that funds with low information asymmetry that issue to time asset markets cater to long-term 
investors, and thus are associated with lower turnover ratio.  
 
DATA 
 
We obtain all seasoned offerings made by closed-end funds from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
database between 1980 and 2004.  We require that the funds have returns and volumes available on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files at the time of the offering.  Our sample contains 135 seasoned offerings.  
There are 29 public underwritten offers and 106 rights offers in the final sample.  Net asset values and market values 
six months prior to issuance, on the closest date to issuance, and six months after issuance are collected from the 
Wall Street Journal.  This information allows us to calculate premiums/discounts around the time of the offering.  
We classify each of the issuing funds in our sample into groups based on the primary assets in which the fund 
invests using annual reports for the funds to determine which category is most relevant. The funds are classified as 
either debt or equity funds and also as either domestic or international funds. Each of these categories of funds 
determines the sectors that we use to form the same-sector groups of non-issuing match funds. Using the fund 
categorizations in the Wall Street Journal, we identify all similarly categorized funds on the closest report date prior 
to the offering for each sample fund and identify this set as our matching funds.  
 
Following Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), we define the turnover ratio as the average trading volume scaled 
by the number of shares outstanding.  The trading volume and shares outstanding are obtained from the CRSP 
database, and the turnover ratio is estimated as a monthly average over the 6-month period prior to and after the 
offering month.   
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Turnover Ratio and Fund Types 
  
Table 1 contains the average turnover ratio for issuing and matching funds categorized by asset class 
(international, domestic, equity and debt). Equity and international funds have significantly higher turnover ratio 
than debt and domestic funds, respectively. This increased trading is observed in both the pre- and post-offering six-
month period for both our sample funds and the matching funds. Using turnover ratio as a proxy for information 
asymmetry, we conclude that international and equity funds have a higher degree of information asymmetry than 
domestic and debt funds, respectively. In unpublished tables, we also confirm that this degree of information 
asymmetry is consistent with the differences across fund types that we observe in both short-run and long-run 
abnormal returns. 
 
In Panel A, we also find that debt and domestic issuers experience a significant drop in turnover across the 
offering period while the change for equity and international issuers is insignificant. We do not observe this same 
pattern in Panel B for the matching funds. We interpret the decline in turnover for the domestic and debt funds as a 
reduction in information asymmetries. Investors of debt and domestic funds may have received assurance over the 
one-year period around the offering. Such assurance can be explained by the realization that such funds are timing 
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undervalued asset markets to maximize shareholder interests. We will examine whether debt and domestic funds are 
indeed market timers later.  
 
 
Table 1:  Changes in Turnover Ratio across Fund Categories for Issuing and Match Funds 
Panel A:  Issuing Funds 
 Equity=92 Debt=42  International=75 Domestic=59  
Turnover (%) Mean Median Mean Median t-stat Mean Median Mean Median t-stat 
Pre-offering 11.20 9.27 5.40 5.06 6.54* 12.79 10.77 5.05 4.82 8.52* 
Post-offering 10.51 8.23 3.74 3.30 7.19* 12.13 10.14 3.63 3.37 8.3* 
Changes -0.69 -0.79 -1.66 -1.26  -0.66 -0.90 -1.41 -1.15  
t-statistic -0.75  -6.46*   -0.59  -6.64*   
Panel B:  Match Funds 
 Equity=2941 Debt=802  International=2621 Domestic=1122  
Turnover (%) Mean Median Mean Median t-stat Mean Median Mean Median t-stat 
Pre-offering 9.46 7.66 4.49 3.83 33.14* 10.15 8.16 4.28 3.59 39.72* 
Post-offering 9.67 7.77 6.87 4.10 1.45 10.49 8.22 5.75 3.71 3.43* 
Changes 0.21 -0.13 2.38 0.23  0.33 -0.01 1.47 0.05  
t-statistic 1.67  1.24   2.37*  1.07   
* Statistical significance at the 0.05 level; ** statistical significance at the 0.10 level 
 
 
As a robustness check, we also compare turnover ratios of issuing and matching funds to ensure the 
previous results are not driven by the fact that equity and international funds tend to have higher turnover. In Table 
2, we compute the difference in turnover ratios between the issuing and matching funds around fund offerings.  
Specifically, we find that issuing funds generate significantly more trading in the 6-month period prior to the 
offering than their non-issuing matching funds. In the six month period leading to the offering, issuing funds 
generate, on average, 1.67% more monthly trading than matching funds. This has been observed across all fund 
categories and such pattern is non-existent in the post-offering period. We interpret the increased trading in the pre-
offering period reflects intensified information asymmetries for the issuing funds.  
 
 
Table 2:  Turnover Ratio Difference between Issuing and Match Funds 
 All firms    
Diff. in turnover Mean Median t-statistic    
Pre-offering 1.67 1.08 3.92*    
Post-offering -0.37 -0.31 -0.55    
 Equity funds Debt funds 
Diff. in turnover Mean Median t-statistic Mean Median t-statistic 
Pre-offering 1.87 1.18 3.38* 1.21 0.76 2.01* 
Post-offering 0.62 0.37 1.19 -2.69 -1.16 -1.46 
 International funds Domestic funds 
Diff. in turnover Mean Median t-statistic Mean Median t-statistic 
Pre-offering 2.13 1.62 3.05* 1.13 0.76 2.67* 
Post-offering 0.54 -0.32 0.8 -1.46 -0.24 -1.18 
 
 
Asset Market Timing 
 
Equity Market Timing vs. Asset Market Timing 
 
Asset market timing is different from equity market timing, the type widely studied in the past. Asset 
market timing describes issuances triggered by favorable asset market conditions. Specifically, when asset market 
prices are low, issuing firms can use the proceeds from issuance to finance new asset purchase. This form of market 
timing aims to time the issuance to exploit temporary pricing inefficiencies in the asset markets while equity market 
timing acts to take advantage of equity pricing errors.  
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We first verify whether these two types of market timing are present with closed-end fund issuers. Graph 1 
illustrates the premium movement for fund issuers within one year surrounding the offering. We observe obvious 
equity market timing with equity and international funds.  Equity and international issuers seem to issue at the end 
of a period of increased premiums that is then followed by a period of large declines in the overall market 
immediately after the issuance. In contrast, debt and domestic funds lack such a timing pattern. This result shows 
that market timing seems to be limited to funds that have more information asymmetries. 
 
 
Graph 1:  Trading Premium for Closed-end Fund Issuers - Six Months before and after the Offering Month 
 
Equity vs. debt closed-end funds 
 
 
International vs. domestic closed-end funds 
 
 
 
To test whether asset market timing actually exists, we first find a market index appropriate for each 
issuing fund. The choice of the market index is determined by the primary investment of the issuing fund. For 
example, the S&P500 Index is selected for general equity funds and Moody‟s “Baa” is the choice for medium grade 
bond funds. For international funds, we match with country or area specific indices.
1
 We collect the prices of 
selected market indexes from 12 months before the offering to 6 months afterwards. Graph 2 plots the asset market 
movements surrounding the closed-end fund SEOs based on fund types. Setting the asset market return in the 
                                                 
1 Data sources range from the Federal Reserve website to general finance websites such as Yahoo! Finance. Publications such as 
The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones Indexes are also used.  
Premium Movements for Equity vs. Debt Funds
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Month -6 Month 0 Month 6
One Year around the Offering
P
re
m
iu
m
 (
%
) 
(M
e
a
n
)
Equity
Debt
Premium Movements for International vs. Domestic funds
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Month -6 Month 0 Month 6
One Year around the Offering
P
re
m
iu
m
 (
%
) 
(M
ea
n)
International
Domestic
Journal of Business & Economics Research – March, 2011 Volume 9, Number 3 
72 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
offering month as zero, we compute cumulate mean changes in asset markets from 12 months prior to and 6 months 
after the offering month.  
 
Between equity and debt issuers, debt issuers are better asset market timers. In the 12 months leading to the 
offering, overall debt markets (proxied by different market indexes) tend to underperform and consequently debt 
instruments become „undervalued‟. The market timing of debt funds is illustrated by the observation that new shares 
are issued when asset markets approach the lowest. If we assume that the issuing proceeds are invested immediately 
following the offering, debt funds will tend to purchase inexpensive bonds that will improve in price as the asset 
market turns around shortly after the offering. The degree of price improvement varies across fund types, but the 
consensus is that debt markets overall stop the „undervalued‟ trend due to the timing behavior of debt funds.  
 
 
Graph 2:  Evidence of Closed-end Funds Timing Asset Markets 
 
 
 
 
For the average equity fund, the offering clusters around a peak in the asset market, which makes any new 
investment more costly. Though the equity asset markets overall seem to increase in value across the sample period, 
the post-offering advance is not as large as the prior period. Compared to debt funds, equity funds are clearly poor 
market timers and making more expensive investment at the cost of the new fund investors. Similar evidence is 
found when international and domestic funds are compared. International funds are poor asset market timers. 
Domestic funds appear to issue and invest before the asset market takes off.  
 
We conduct a proportions test to examine whether market timers are equally distributed across fund types 
with the results reported in Table 3. We categorize funds as good asset market timers if the offerings coincide with a 
downward movement in the asset market. Specifically, if the pre-offering average index value exceeds the average 
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post-offering index value, the offering fund is defined as a good market timer.
2
 In Panels A, B and C of Table 3, we 
present results of the proportion tests for debt and equity funds. In Panel A, we show that 70% of debt issuers are 
identified as asset market timers based on our measure and only 29% of equity issuers behave like asset market 
timers. The difference between these two proportions is significantly different from zero based on the Chi-square 
test, Fisher‟s exact test and the Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test. We control for domestic and international funds in 
Panel B and Panel C and find similar results. 
 
As shown in panel D, E, and F, we are unable to find significant differences in proportions of asset market 
timers in international and domestic funds. In Panel D, 47% of domestic issuers are market timers, and 34% of 
international issuers are market timers. The difference is not significant. In panel E and F, we control for debt and 
equity funds, and the difference in proportions of market timers virtually disappears. We conclude that asset market 
timing is primarily practiced in debt markets, both domestic and international.  
 
 
Table 3:  Evidence of Closed-end Funds Timing Asset Markets across Fund Types 
This table presents results of proportion tests for market timers across four fund categories. A closed-end fund is considered a 
market timer if the offering coincides with a downward movement in the underlying asset market. For each fund issuer, an 
appropriate asset market index is selected and index values in the pre- and post-offering are collected. Market timers are funds 
that issue when the pre-offering average index value exceeds the post-offering index value. Alternative methods to define market 
timers are tried and similar results are obtained. P-values for Chi-square test, Fisher‟s Exact Test and Cochran-Mantel-Haenzel 
Test are reported. Proportion tests are conducted between equity and debt closed-end funds with results in Panels B and C after 
controlling for domestic and then international classifications respectively. 
Panel A:  Proportion of Market Timers 
Market timers Equity Debt Chi-square (p-value) Fisher's Exact Test (p-value) 
Cochran-Mantel- 
Haenszel Test 
Yes 24 21    
No 59 9    
% Yes 29% 70% <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 
Panel B:  Controlling for Domestic Funds 
Market timers Equity Debt Chi-square (p-value) Fisher's Exact Test (p-value)  
Yes 8 16    
No 20 7    
% Yes 29% 70% 0.0035 0.005  
Panel C:  Controlling for International Funds 
Market timers Equity Debt Chi-square (p-value) Fisher's Exact Test (p-value)  
Yes 8 5    
No 20 2    
% Yes 29% 71% 0.0258 0.0387  
Panel D:  Proportion of Market Timers 
Market timers International Domestic Chi-square (p-value) Fisher's Exact Test (p-value) Cochran-Mantel- 
Haenszel Test 
Yes 21 24    
No 41 27    
% Yes 34% 47% 0.1541 0.1792 0.9302 
Panel E:  Controlling for Debt Funds 
Market timers International Domestic Chi-square (p-value) Fisher's Exact Test (p-value)  
Yes 5 16    
No 2 7    
% Yes 71% 70% 0.925 1  
Panel F:  Controlling for Equity Funds 
Market timers International Domestic Chi-square (p-value) Fisher's Exact Test (p-value)  
Yes 16 8    
No 39 20    
% Yes 29% 29% 0.9606 1  
 
                                                 
2 Alternative methods to define market timers are used and similar results hold. 
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Asset Market Timing and Long-Run Fund Returns 
 
Knowing that debt issuers are good asset market timers, we want to verify whether this type of market 
timing generates better long-run returns. Table 4 presents unadjusted and adjusted holding period returns for closed-
end fund issuers from 1980 to 2004. Adjusted returns are obtained by using the average return of the match funds 
corresponding to each issuing fund as a benchmark. The two- and three-year post-offering return calculation uses a 
smaller sample due to data availability for fund offerings in 2003 and 2004. In the post-offering years, while equity 
fund issuers suffer significantly negative adjusted returns, debt fund issuers generate either significantly positive 
returns (10.714% for the two years following the offering) or insignificant returns. Between international and 
domestic fund issuers, since we have not detected any significant difference in their ability to time asset markets, we 
equally expect no significant difference in their post-offering long-run returns. Both types generate insignificant 
returns with one exception. International funds, similar to equity funds, realize significantly negative returns in the 3 
years following the offering. As shown previously, international and equity funds are good equity market timers and 
they take advantage of information asymmetry in the equity market to exploit the interest of new investors. As in the 
case of industrial firms, information-asymmetry driven issuers experience significantly negative long-run 
performance.  
 
 
Table 4:  Long-run Holding Period Returns across Fund Types 
 Unadjusted Holding Period Returns 
(Sample Size) 
Adjusted Holding Period Returns 
(Sample Size) 
Sample Prior year 1 year 
post 
2 years 
post 
3 years 
post 
Prior 
year 
1 year post 2 years post 3 years 
post 
All 22.862%* 
(126) 
2.851% 
(129) 
7.075%* 
(121) 
8.651%* 
(118) 
3.420% 
(90) 
-1.465% 
(87) 
-3.031% 
(79) 
-6.528%** 
(77) 
Equity 
funds 
28.052%* 
(89) 
0.282% 
(87) 
3.704% 
(84) 
3.328% 
(82) 
4.566% 
(63) 
-3.736%** 
(60) 
-8.336%* 
(57) 
-12.311%* 
(55) 
Debt 
funds 
10.378%* 
(37) 
8.170%* 
(42) 
14.728%* 
(37) 
20.777%* 
(36) 
0.748% 
(27) 
3.582% 
(27) 
10.714%** 
(22) 
7.928% 
(22) 
International 
funds 
29.956%* 
(74) 
0.137% 
(71) 
2.578% 
(70) 
-1.570% 
(70) 
7.037%* 
(51) 
-2.583% 
(47) 
-3.094% 
(46) 
-11.346%* 
(46) 
Domestic 
funds 
12.766%* 
(52) 
6.172%* 
(58) 
13.247%* 
(51) 
23.559%* 
(48) 
-1.308% 
(39) 
-0.152% 
(40) 
-2.943% 
(33) 
0.620% 
(31) 
 
 
Asset Market Timing and Long-term Investors 
 
Given that asset market timers are primarily debt funds, we expect that such funds are more likely to attract 
long-term investors. Investor trading horizon can be captured by turnover ratio according to Froot, Perold and Stein 
(1992). We verify that debt funds indeed have significantly lower turnover ratio than that of equity funds, as 
previously shown in Table 1. The average turnover ratio of debt funds is 1/3 to 1/2 of that of equity funds around the 
issuance.  
 
Robustness Check:  Regression Results 
  
We use a regression framework to examine the extent to which information asymmetry, proxy by turnover 
ratio, explains the short-term and long-term market responses to the closed-end fund seasoned offerings. We include 
the premium/discount immediately prior to the issue (PREM), the average turnover ratio within six months prior to 
the issue (PRETO), and the change in NAV immediately surrounding the issue (DIFFNAV).  For both the short-run 
and long-run return regressions, we include the one-year pre-issue return (PRERET) to account for the possibility of 
price reversals explaining the long-run returns.  Finally, for the long-run return regressions we include the 
announcement date abnormal return (ABRET) in order to control for potential over- or under- reaction to the 
issuance. Our independent variables include ABRET to examine the short-term market responses and then one-year, 
two-year and three-year post offering holding period returns (POSTAR1, POSTAR2 and POSTAR3) to examine the 
long-term market responses to the offerings. 
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Table 5:  Determinants of Short-run and Long-run Returns 
Panel A:  Regression Results for Equity Fund 
 Regression Coefficients  
Indep. 
Variable 
Intercept DIFFNAV PRERET PRETO PREM ABRET R-Squared 
ABRET 
(N = 81) 
0.019 0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.014  0.096 
POSTAR1 
(N = 76) 
0.083 0.123* -0.122 0.004 -0.125 -2.083 0.191 
POSTAR2 
(N = 74) 
0.134 0.124* -0.235* -0.004 -0.027 -3.395** 0.163 
POSTAR3 
(N = 72) 
0.070 0.122* 0.001 -0.012** 0.049 -1.954 0.147 
Panel B:  Regression Results for Debt Funds 
 Regression Coefficients  
Indep. 
Variable 
Intercept DIFFNAV PRERET PRETO PREM ABRET R-Squared 
ABRET 
(N = 29) 
-0.002 0.001 0.007 -0.001* 0.000  0.018 
POSTAR1 
(N = 29) 
0.846* 0.056 0.234 0.012 -0.851* -0.356 0.263 
POSTAR2 
(N = 25) 
1.057** 0.074 0.147 0.033 -1.065** 5.334 0.251 
POSTAR3 
(N = 25) 
0.816 -0.014 0.271 0.033 -0.805 4.532 0.171 
Panel C:  Regression Results for International Funds 
 Regression Coefficients  
Indep. 
Variable 
Intercept DIFFNAV PRERET PRETO PREM ABRET R-Squared 
ABRET 
(N = 70) 
0.025 0.002 0.004 -0.001* -0.175  0.105 
POSTAR1 
(N = 66) 
0.198 0.174* -0.097 0.004 -0.241 -2.444 0.232 
POSTAR2 
(N = 65) 
0.344 0.224* -0.243 -0.005 -0.209 -3.069 0.232 
POSTAR3 
(N = 65) 
0.216 0.254* 0.029 -0.010 -0.142 -1.739 0.223 
Panel D:  Regression Results for Domestic Funds 
 Regression Coefficients  
Indep. 
Variable 
Intercept DIFFNAV PRERET PRETO PREM ABRET R-Squared 
ABRET 
(N = 40) 
0.008 0.001 -0.020 -0.002* 0.000  0.146 
POSTAR1 
(N = 39) 
0.621* 0.044 -0.023 -0.008 -0.515* -0.396 0.137 
POSTAR2 
(N = 34) 
0.439 -0.089 0.275 -0.024 -0.263 -2.250 0.150 
POSTAR3 
(N = 32) 
1.329* 0.008 -0.379 -0.046** -0.835 -2.927 0.249 
 
 
 Regression results for the four fund types are presented in Table 5. For international, domestic and equity 
funds, announcement day abnormal returns seem to be significantly inversely related to pre-offering turnover ratio at 
the 5% level. Funds with higher turnover ratios tend to have lower announcement day abnormal returns. In the 
framework of information asymmetry, issuers with more information asymmetries should have worse market 
reactions. These regression results provide additional support for our interpretation that turnover ratio is a good 
proxy for information asymmetry.  
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 The ability of the turnover ratio measure to explain long-term market response is slightly mixed. For equity 
fund issuers, an example of good equity market timers, the higher the turnover ratio, the lower the post-offering 3-
year returns. For debt funds, an example of good asset market timers, there is no significant relation detected 
between turnover ratio and long-run returns. This is consistent with our argument that information asymmetry does 
not play a significant role in the equity offerings of debt funds.  
 
There are other explanatory variables that are occasionally significant in explaining abnormal returns. The 
evidence is rarely consistent among the several measures of returns, so we refrain from providing any analysis.  
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this study, we extend the previous research on whether and how information asymmetry explains the 
decision to issue seasoned offerings among closed-end funds. Although closed-end funds operate with marketable 
securities and presumably suffer fewer information asymmetries, there still exists a possibility that there might be 
large variation in information asymmetry across fund types. The source of the potential variation is related to the 
different security choices. Some securities are harder to price than others, so funds investing in these securities may 
present a harder valuation case for potential fund investors.  
 
 Using turnover ratio as an alternative measure of information asymmetry, we are able to show that equity 
and international funds suffer more information asymmetry and thus their issuing decision is primarily driven by 
information asymmetry. Similar to industrial issuers, they report long-term underperformance. In contrast, debt and 
domestic issuers suffer less information asymmetry. Instead of timing equity markets, they choose to time the 
underlying asset markets. This is a form of market timing benefiting both existing and new investors as it maximizes 
the long-run performance of the issuing funds. We show that both debt and domestic funds time their issuance when 
the asset markets are relatively underpriced. This pattern is particularly stronger for debt fund issuers. A proportion 
test also confirms that a large majority of debt fund issuers are asset market timers.  
 
 In addition, by interpreting turnover ratio as a measure of investor trading horizon, we also confirm that 
debt and domestic funds, by timing asset markets, are favored by long-term investors.  
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